DedSec Project

RAG, Vector Databases and AI Retrieval Security — DedSec Project

RAG, Vector Databases and AI Retrieval Security Retrieval-augmented generation introduces a new data and trust pipeline. Study ingestion, embeddings, chunking, metadata authorization…

Retrieval-augmented generation introduces a new data and trust pipeline. Study ingestion, embeddings, chunking, metadata authorization, prompt-injection through documents, provenance and output grounding.

Learning objectives

By the end of this module you should be able to:

Deep concepts

1. RAG architecture and trust boundaries

Retrieval-Augmented Generation combines ingestion, storage/indexing, retrieval, prompt assembly, model execution, and output handling. Each step has different authority: retrieved text should be treated as untrusted data, not as instructions that automatically override application policy.

2. ingestion and parsing

Documents may contain active formats, malformed content, hidden text, metadata, or instructions designed for downstream models. Normalize and parse in a constrained pipeline, restrict supported formats, scan resource usage, and preserve source identity/provenance.

3. chunking and embeddings

Chunk size, overlap, metadata, and embedding model affect what content is retrievable and how boundaries are preserved. Security-sensitive labels such as tenant, classification, and source should remain explicit metadata rather than being inferred only from semantic similarity.

4. tenancy and authorization

Vector similarity is not authorization. Filter candidate content using server-side tenant/resource permissions before it can enter the model context, and test with two synthetic tenants to ensure nearest-neighbor results cannot cross access boundaries.

5. metadata filters

Metadata filters must be constructed from trusted application state and validated by the storage layer. Avoid letting a model or client generate arbitrary filters that broaden tenant, confidentiality, or document-state constraints.

6. indirect prompt injection

Retrieved content can contain text that attempts to manipulate the model or connected tools. Separate instructions from data, constrain tool permissions, label provenance, apply deterministic authorization outside the model, and assume untrusted documents may contain adversarial instructions.

7. source provenance and citations

Store document identity, version, ingestion time, owner/tenant, classification, and source location so an answer can be traced back to evidence. Citations help auditability but should be generated from the actual retrieved source set, not invented by the model.

8. poisoning, deletion and reindexing

A poisoned or outdated document can remain in embeddings after the source changes. Define authenticated ingestion, review, deletion propagation, reindexing, version rollback, and incident procedures that can identify which answers were influenced by a bad corpus version.

Authorized lab sequence

Knowledge checks

Answer these without looking at the notes:

Next modules

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