DedSec Project

DNSSEC, DoH, DoQ, Resolver Privacy and DNS Trust — DedSec Project

DNSSEC, DoH, DoQ, Resolver Privacy and DNS Trust Extend DNS knowledge into validation and privacy: DNSSEC trust chains, encrypted resolver transports, resolver discovery, split-horizon…

Extend DNS knowledge into validation and privacy: DNSSEC trust chains, encrypted resolver transports, resolver discovery, split-horizon behavior, caching and operational failure modes.

Learning objectives

By the end of this module you should be able to:

Deep concepts

1. DNSSEC chain of trust

DNSSEC authenticates DNS data through signatures and a chain of trust from configured trust anchors through DS and DNSKEY relationships. It provides origin authentication/integrity for DNS records, not confidentiality and not proof that the destination application itself is trustworthy.

2. DS, DNSKEY and RRSIG

DNSKEY records publish zone signing keys, DS records link parent and child zones, and RRSIG records carry signatures over RRsets. Operational security depends on correct key rollover, timing, algorithm support, and avoiding broken delegation state during changes.

3. authenticated denial of existence

DNSSEC can prove that a requested name or type does not exist using authenticated denial mechanisms. Negative answers are security-relevant state and must be validated/cached with the same care as positive answers.

4. DoH and DoT

DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS protect resolver traffic in transit to a chosen resolver. Encryption changes visibility and policy enforcement but does not by itself guarantee that the resolver is trustworthy or that returned data is DNSSEC-valid.

5. DoQ

DNS over QUIC carries DNS messages over QUIC and inherits encrypted transport, connection, and operational properties from QUIC. Resolver policy, authentication, resource limits, and fallback behavior should be explicit across all supported transports.

6. resolver policy and discovery

Endpoints can learn resolvers through network configuration, operating-system policy, applications, enterprise management, or encrypted-DNS discovery. Security teams should know which component wins when policies conflict and which paths bypass enterprise logging/filtering.

7. split-horizon DNS

Internal and external resolvers may intentionally return different data. Document the expected namespace and trust boundary so caching, VPN changes, encrypted resolvers, or application-specific DNS do not expose internal names or route users to the wrong service.

8. cache TTL and stale answers

Resolvers cache positive and negative answers according to TTL and local policy; some systems can serve stale data during outages. Incident response must account for propagation delay and cache state when rotating addresses, certificates, or maliciously altered records.

Authorized lab sequence

Knowledge checks

Answer these without looking at the notes:

Next modules

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